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Cursor Rules are .cursorrules / .cursor/rules files that steer Cursor's AI; scanned with the same pipeline.
We found this by crawling public sources and nobody has attested to it. That is how most of the registry gets here, and it is not a mark against the artifact — it only means no authenticated act of publication is on record. An artifact can be the vendor's own and still appear here.
8 critical findings reported by cisco-skill-scanner. The composite score alone does not reflect this — read the per-scanner reports below.
This artifact ships from 2 sources and their verdicts differ. The worst is github (Flagged). Installing from a cleaner source does not mean the others are safe — check the source you actually install from.
github: https://github.com/ryoha000/remoterg, 442 findings
Cursor Rules are .cursorrules / .cursor/rules files that steer Cursor's AI. Review the scanned source before copying them into your own project.
nerlo install -- ryoha000/remoterg
6 of 11 scanners examined this package. The rest do not apply to it — language, ecosystem and packaging decide which analyzers can say anything, and a scanner that cannot examine an artifact reports nothing rather than passing it.
v1.4.0
2 findings · 0.8s
v2.0.11
360 findings · 17.5s
v0.3.74
12 findings · 10.4s
v0.1.0
3 findings · 5.6s
v0.1.0
0 findings · 5.6s
v0.1.0
0 findings · 8.0s
vv0.3.2
No Go packages were found in this artifact. What each scanner covers
0 findings · 0.1s
No report in this scan: govulncheck, osv-scanner, trivy, trivy_image.
1 scan on record. Every scan's full results are retained immutably for 24 months.
| Completed | Composite | Change | Scanners | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 20, 2026 | Scan Halted | — | agentshield: completecisco-skill-scanner: completeagent-audit-kit: completenerlo-behavioral: completenerlo-install-instruction: completecapslock ·n/a: not applicablenerlo-multi-source: complete | rejected |
Findings in files this artifact installs stand as reported; a model re-read the rest and said which ones it believes are false positives. This is a second opinion published beside the evidence, not a correction to it: the per-scanner reports above are unchanged, every dismissed finding is still listed there at its original severity, and the score and the Flagged badge are computed from those raw severities alone. Nothing below moved them.
Out of 377 findings across every scanner that examined this package. None of the 8 findings rated critical by their scanner were dismissed.
Not reviewed is not the same as clean. Those 372 findings stand exactly as their scanners reported them, at full severity, as they would have without this review.
Two keys had to turn. The model had to name a reason from a fixed list of six, and a deterministic check of ours — over which files this artifact actually installs — had to independently agree. Anything it could not corroborate is in “not reviewed” above, at full severity.
1 Agent instruction file — The match is in a file that instructs an AI coding agent — a CLAUDE.md or similar. It is documentation of intent, and our own check confirmed it is not part of what gets installed.
Rules: TOOL_ABUSE_UNDECLARED_NETWORK · Files: /repo/repo/CLAUDE.md · reported by cisco-skill-scanner
The model could have called any of these a false positive and did not.
3 EXCESSIVE_FILE_COUNT
Files: /repo/., /repo/desktop/services/., /repo/android/. · reported by cisco-skill-scanner
1 LOW_ANALYZABILITY
Files: /repo · reported by cisco-skill-scanner
240 The model called these false positives and our own check did not agree, so the dismissal was refused.
Rules: ARCHIVE_FILE_DETECTED, AAK-TRUST-006, UNANALYZABLE_BINARY and 7 more · Files: /repo/android/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar, .claude/settings.local.json, /repo/android/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar!/org/gradle/cli/CommandLineParser$OptionComparator.class and 73 more · reported by cisco-skill-scanner, agent-audit-kit, agentshield
75 The review budget for this scan was already spent before these findings were reached.
Rules: BINARY_FILE_DETECTED, opt.nerlo-rules.nerlo-hardcoded-external-egress · Files: /repo/android/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar!/org/gradle/cli/AbstractPropertiesCommandLineConverter.class, /repo/android/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar!/org/gradle/wrapper/Download$1.class, /repo/android/gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar!/org/gradle/cli/ParsedCommandLineOption.class and 41 more · reported by cisco-skill-scanner, nerlo-behavioral
57 The review call did not complete.
Rules: COMMAND_INJECTION_JS_CHILD_PROCESS, COMMAND_INJECTION_EVAL, LOW_ANALYZABILITY and 12 more · Files: /repo/client/apps/web/scripts/e2e-test.ts, /repo/scripts/export_onnx.py, /repo/client and 27 more · reported by cisco-skill-scanner, agentshield, nerlo-behavioral and 1 more
Critical command injection and potential credential exposure.
The artifact contains critical command injection vulnerabilities, allowing shell execution in `e2e-test.ts` and arbitrary code execution via `eval` in `export_onnx.py`. High-severity findings indicate potential credential access and network egress, along with overly permissive configurations in `settings.local.json`. These issues warrant immediate attention due to the potential for unauthorized system access and data exfiltration.
Concern level assessed by the review: Critical. This is the review's scale, not the registry badge.
Showing 10 of 10; the rest are in the per-scanner reports above.
Reviewed by gemini-2.5-flash. The model sees the findings, not your code, and cannot change a score.